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dc.contributor.authorCastaño Ríos, Carlos Eduardospa
dc.contributor.authorTabares Higuita, Diana Sirleyspa
dc.contributor.authorOsorio Agudelo, Jair Albeirospa
dc.contributor.authorZamarra Londoño, Julián Estebanspa
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-15 00:00:00
dc.date.available2021-07-15 00:00:00
dc.date.issued2021-07-15
dc.identifier.issn0122-8900
dc.description.abstractEl mercado de valores colombiano ha sido poco estudiado desde la perspectiva del Gobierno Corporativo y menos aún, si se considera la composición de las Juntas Directivas de las empresas que cotizan en la Bolsa de Valores. Este artículo busca evidenciar si el nivel de formación y la composición entre externos e internos de las Juntas Directivas inciden en el desempeño financiero de estas entidades. Para tal fin, se emplea una muestra de empresas que cotizan en bolsa y que cuentan con los datos necesarios para el estudio. La información se analizó a través de un modelo de panel de datos y se encuentra que el nivel de formación no tiene relación con el desempeño financiero de las empresas, y que el grado de personas externas (independientes) que están en la organización influyen positivamente en el EBITDA.spa
dc.description.abstractThe Colombian stock market has been little studied from the perspective of Corporate Governance and even less, if the composition of the Boards of Directors of companies listed on the Stock Market is considered. This article seeks to show whether the level of training and the composition with external and internal members of the Boards of Directors affect the financial performance of these entities. For this purpose, a sample of firms that are listed on the stock market was used. The information was analyzed through a data panel model, and it was found that the level of training is not related to the financial performance of the companies, and that the degree of external membership positively influence the EBITDA.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherUniversidad de Cartagenaspa
dc.relation.ispartofjournalPanorama Económicospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0spa
dc.sourcehttps://revistas.unicartagena.edu.co/index.php/panoramaeconomico/article/view/3650spa
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceeng
dc.subjectEBITDAeng
dc.subjectComposition of Board of Directorseng
dc.subjectColombian stock marketeng
dc.subjectGobierno Corporativospa
dc.subjectEBITDAspa
dc.subjectComposición Junta Directivaspa
dc.subjectmercado de valores colombianospa
dc.titleIncidencia de la composición de juntas directivas y su grado de formación en el desempeño financiero de las empresas colombianasspa
dc.typeArtículo de revistaspa
dc.title.translatedImpact of the composition of boards of directors and their degree of training on the financial performance of colombian companieseng
dc.identifier.doi10.32997/pe-2021-3650
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionspa
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85spa
dc.rights.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2spa
dc.identifier.eissn2463-0470
dc.identifier.urlhttps://doi.org/10.32997/pe-2021-3650
dc.relation.bitstreamhttps://revistas.unicartagena.edu.co/index.php/panoramaeconomico/article/download/3650/3062
dc.relation.citationeditionNúm. 3 , Año 2021spa
dc.relation.citationendpage184
dc.relation.citationissue3spa
dc.relation.citationstartpage172
dc.relation.citationvolume29spa
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dc.rights.creativecommonsEsta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.spa
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dc.type.localJournal articleeng
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